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Food Stamps, Unjust Enrichment, and
Minimum Wage
Candace Kovacic-Fleischer†
Introduction
News and social media are full of stories about workers
who receive wages so low they qualify for taxpayer-funded
governmental benefits, including food stamps.1 Many of these
workers are employed by large retail chains that advertise deep
discount prices and have the power to set the wage rate.2 Many of
these chains pay their low-level employees at or near the federal
minimum wage:3 $7.25 per hour.4 Besides paying low wages,
many of these retailers limit the number of hours their employees
can work to no more than forty.5 Employees, therefore, cannot
†. Professor of Law, Emerita, American University Washington College of
Law; J.D., Northeastern University School of Law; A.B., Wellesley College. This
paper grew out of a paper for Russell Weaver’s Remedies Discussion Forum in
Louisville, Kentucky, December, 2015. I would like to thank the participants,
especially Mae Kuykendall and Paul Zweir for their comments and suggestions,
and David Fleischer, Billie Jo Kaufmann, Thomas Michl, Jennifer Mueller, Ezra
Rosser, Allison Sabo, and Emily Williams for theirs. Special thanks to my
husband, Walter Fleischer, for his analytic and editorial assistance with many
drafts, and to my Dean’s Fellow, Theresa Lau, Class of 2016, for her thorough
research.
1. See, e.g., KEN JACOBS, IAN BERRY, & JENIFER MACGILLVAY, THE HIGH
PUBLIC COST OF LOW WAGES (2015) (analyzing the relationship between low wages
and federal and state expenditures); Khushbu Shah, 52 Percent of Fast Food
Workers Need Government Assistance to Make Ends Meet, EATER (Apr. 13, 2015,
1:30 PM), http://www.eater.com/2015/4/13/8403905/52-percent-fast-food-workerspublic-assistance-food-stamps-study (reviewing the effect of low wages on
government expenditures).
2. These chains have monopsony power, i.e. the power to choose a marketwide wage rate. See Paul Krugman, The Mutability of Wages, N.Y. TIMES (June 1,
2015), http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/06/11/the-mutability-of-wages/.
3. See, e.g., Walter Hickey, The 20 Companies with the Most Low-Wage
Workers, BUSINESS INSIDER (Feb. 3, 2013, 1:31 PM), http://www.businessinsider.
com/the-20-companies-with-the-most-low-wage-workers-2013-2 (listing Wal-Mart
Stores and McDonald’s Corp. as the first and third largest low-wage employers,
respectively).
4. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1) (2012). A number of states and localities have raised
their minimum wage. See, e.g., J. Chris Cunningham, Measuring Wage Inequality
Within and Across U.S. Metropolitan Areas, 2003–13, 138 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 1
(Sept. 2015) (reporting on wage inequality throughout the United States by region);
Minimum Wages By State, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (July 19, 2016),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/state-minimum-wagechart.aspx (listing the minimum wage in each state).
5. Many employers restrict hours drastically. Charlotte Alexander & Anna
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earn “time-and-a-half” overtime pay.6 The policy of restricting
hourly employees’ hours to less than forty hours per week
encourages some salaried managers to require employees to work
“off-the-clock,” a practice known as “wage theft.”7
In contrast, news and social media carry stories about a
growing wage disparity between executives and frontline workers.8
Scholars have written about economic problems caused by growing
income inequality between the richest and the poorest Americans.9
Many low-wage retailers have large disparities between the
annual salaries of their executives and low-level workers. For
example, the pay ratio of Wal-Mart’s CEO to a full-time Wal-Mart
employee has been reported to be 1450:1,10 with the CEO making
$23.9 million11 while the average earnings of Wal-Mart cashiers
ranged from $17,515 to $25,094.12 Similar figures are seen when
looking at Target Corp.,13 with its CEO receiving compensation of
Haley-Lock, Not Enough Work Hours in the Day: Work Hours Insecurity and a New
Approach to Wage and Hour Regulation 3 (Ga. State Univ. Coll. of Law, Legal
Studies Research Paper No. 2013-24, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2367070.
6. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (2012) (“No employer shall employ any of his
employees . . . for a workweek longer than forty hours . . . unless such employee
receives compensation . . . in excess of [forty hours] at a rate not less than one and
one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed.”).
7. Ari Weisbard & Geoffrey Leonard, Community Lawyering and the Wage
Theft Prevention Act of 2014, 22 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 429, 430–31 (2015).
8. See, e.g., Leslie Patton, McDonald’s $8.25 Man and $8.75 Million CEO
Shows Pay Gap, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 11, 2012, 11:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2012-12-12/mcdonald-s-8-25-man-and-8-75-million-ceo-shows-pay-gap
(discussing the difference in pay between a twenty-year McDonald’s employee and
then-CEO Jim Skinner).
9. See Dimitri B. Papadimitiou, Greg Hannsgen, & Gennaro Zezza, Back to
Business As Usual? Or a Fiscal Bust?, STRATEGIC ANALYSIS 3 (Apr. 2012)
(“[I]ncreasing concentration of income among the very wealthiest tends to slow
down economic growth for reasons that vary from the simple to the complex.”).
10. See Orly Lobel, Big-Box Benefits: The Targeting of Giants in a National
Campaign to Raise Work Conditions, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1685, 1699 (2007)
(comparing the ratio of GM’s CEO’s earnings to an assembly line worker’s salary in
1950 (135:1) with that of Wal-Mart’s CEO to a full-time Wal-Mart worker in 2003
(1450:1)); see also CEO Pay: How Much Do CEOs Make Compared to Their
Employees?, PAYSCALE, http://www.payscale.com/data-packages/ceo-pay/full-list
(last visited Jan. 10, 2017) (listing Wal-Mart’s CEO’s salary as compared to the
median salary of an employee as 209:1).
11. Base pay of $950,000 with an additional $23 million in stock awards and
incentives. Tom Huddleston, Jr., A Wal-Mart Worker Making $9 an Hour Would
Have to Work 2.8 Million Hours to Match the CEO’s Pay, FORTUNE (Feb. 19, 2015,
4:08
PM),
http://fortune.com/2015/02/19/wal-mart-wage-hike-2-million-hours/
(noting an expected hourly raise in 2016).
12. Average Salary For Cashier at Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., PAYSCALE,
http://www.payscale.com/research/US/Employer=Wal-Mart_Stores%2c_Inc/Hourly_
Rate/Job/Cashier (last visited Jan. 10, 2017).
13. See CEO Pay, supra note 10 (listing Target’s CEO’s salary as compared to
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$28.2 million14 and its cashiers earning between $16,648 to
$22,260.15 The salaries of many low-level employees remain below
the federal poverty level of $24,257 for a family of four.16 WalMart recently announced a wage increase to ten dollars per hour.17
That is not enough, however, to put a family of four above the
poverty level, especially if hours are kept to a minimum.18
Although many large stores that advertise discount prices are
paying poverty-level wages, not all do.19 For example, the wages
of Costco’s cashiers range from $19,056 to $42,093,20 and the CEOto-worker pay ratio at Costco has been reported to be 48:1.21
the median salary of an employee as 99:1).
14. See Tess Stynes, Target CEO’s 2014 Pay Package Totals $28.2 Million,
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 28, 2015, 9:24 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/target-ceos-2014pay-package-totals-28-2-million-1430227494.
15. See Average Salary for Target Corporation Employees, PAYSCALE,
http://www.payscale.com/research/US/Employer=Target_Corporation/Salary (last
visited Jan. 10, 2017).
16. Poverty Threshold, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/data/
tables/time-series/demo/income-poverty/historical-poverty-thresholds.html
(last
visited Oct. 17, 2016) (follow “2015” hyperlink under “Poverty Thresholds by Size
of Family and Number of Children”).
17. See Press Release, More Than One Million Wal-Mart Associates to Receive
Pay Increase in 2016 (Jan. 20, 2016), http://corporate.walmart.com/_news_/newsarchive/2016/01/20/more-than-one-million-walmart-associates-receive-pay-increasein-2016.
18. David Cooper, The Minimum Wage Used to be Enough to Keep Workers Out
of Poverty—It’s Not Anymore, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Dec. 4, 2013),
http://www.epi.org/publication/minimum-wage-workers-poverty-anymore-raising/
(demonstrating that a minimum wage of $10.10 would lift a family of three above
the poverty line, but also explaining that a family of three relying on that salary
would still qualify for food stamps and a family of four relying on the same would
also inevitably be below the poverty line). According to a statistical analysis
published by a research unit of the University of California, Berkeley, if minimum
wage were raised from $7.25 to $10.10, annual federal spending on food stamps for
employed recipients would decrease by about six percent. See Michael Reich &
Rachel West, The Effects of Minimum Wages on Food Stamp Enrollment and
Expenditures 1 (Inst. for Res. on Lab. and Employment, Working Paper No. 112-15,
June 2015), http://www.irle.berkeley.edu/workingpapers/112-15.pdf; Bourree Lam,
Walmart Workers Get a Raise, but Is That Enough?, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 21, 2016),
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/01/walmart-raise-2016/425058
(discussing how wages have been offset by reduced employee hours, but noting the
high cost of wage increases and falling stock prices, while Wal-Mart continues to
make $3 billion per quarter).
19. See, e.g., Brad Stone, Costco CEO Craig Jelinek Leads the Cheapest,
Happiest Company in the World, BLOOMBERG (June 7, 2013, 3:54 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-06-06/costco-ceo-craig-jelinek-leadsthe-cheapest-happiest-company-in-the-world (comparing the average wages of a
Costco employee to the minimum wages received by Wal-Mart employees).
20. See Average Salary for Costco Wholesale Company Employees, PAYSCALE,
http://www.payscale.com/research/US/Employer=Costco_Wholesale_Company/Sala
ry (last visited Jan. 10, 2017).
21. Kevin Short, 11 Reasons to Love Costco That Have Nothing to Do with
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Different than Wal-Mart and other low-wage retailers, Costco’s
strategy of providing higher wages for workers prioritizes low
turnover.22
Low wage retailers consider many of their employees who
earn so little to be full-time workers.23 Even so, many full-time
workers require government aid.24 The aid comes from a number
of programs including housing, child-care, and energy assistance.25
This Article focuses on assistance from the Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), colloquially known as the
food stamp program.26 As its name implies, SNAP enables the
working poor to purchase food. States administer the program,
but the program is funded with federal tax money.27 To qualify for
food stamps, households of four must earn less than $2,633 per
month or $31,596 per year;28 approximately equal to 130% of the

Shopping, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 20, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2013/11/19/reasons-love-costco_n_4275774.html.
22. See ANTHONY BIANCO, THE BULLY OF BENTONVILLE 194 (2006) (“The key to
Costco’s new math of discount retailing is an annual turnover rate of just 23
percent, half of Wal-Mart’s.”); Emily Jane Fox, Worker Wages: Wendy’s vs. WalMart vs. Costco, CNN MONEY (Aug. 6, 2013, 1:37 PM), http://money.cnn.com/
2013/08/06/news/economy/costco-fast-food-strikes/ (noting that Costco invests in the
satisfaction and well-being of its employees).
23. Fact Sheet—Wages, MAKING CHANGE AT WAL-MART,
http://making
changeatwalmart.org/factsheet/walmart-watch-fact-sheets/fact-sheet-wages/ (last
visited Sept. 19, 2016) (stating that the average worker has full-time status at
thirty-four hours per week).
24. Press Release, House Committee on Education & the Workforce, Low
Wages at a Single Wal-Mart Store Cost Taxpayers about $1 Million Every Year,
Says New Committee Staff Report (May 30, 2013), http://democratsedworkforce.house.gov/media/press-releases/low-wages-at-a-single-wal-mart-storecost-taxpayers-about-1-million-every-year-says-new-committee-staff-report (stating
that Wal-Mart does not pay its employees enough to afford “the necessities of life”).
25. See id. (“This taxpayer subsidy calculation also includes programs like
subsidized housing assistance, the food-stamp program, child-care subsidies,
energy assistance, and reduced school meals.”); see also Clare O’Connor, Walmart
Workers Cost Taxpayers $6.2 Billion in Public Assistance, FORBES (Apr. 15, 2014,
3:35 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/clareoconnor/2014/04/15/report-walmartworkers-cost-taxpayers-6-2-billion-in-public-assistance/#2d2e0a5e7cd8 (listing food
stamps, Medicaid, and subsidized housing among the categories of public
assistance Wal-Mart workers seek).
26. 7 U.S.C. § 2035 (2012). The food stamp program no longer issues stamps.
It uses Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT) cards. They work like a debit card; they
require a personal identification number (PIN) and can be electronically monitored
and tracked. See Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), USDA
FOOD & NUTRITION SERV., http://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/eligibility (last updated
Oct. 20, 2016). For ease of reading, this paper will refer to the benefits as food
stamps.
27. 7 U.S.C. § 2035(b) (2012).
28. See SNAP, supra note 26; see also 7 C.F.R. § 273.9(a) (2015) (elaborating on
how eligibility is determined).
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federal poverty line of $24,257.29 An employee who earns the
minimum wage of $7.25 per hour and works 40 hours per week
would make $290 per week, $1,060 per four weeks, and $15,080
per fifty-two weeks, substantially below the poverty line.30 If that
employee is the only income-earner in a household of four, the
household could receive up to $649 per month in food stamps.31
One reason low-wage retailers pay so little is that the
minimum wage, enacted as part of the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA), has not been raised from $7.25 since 2009.32 Thus, any
pay rate above $7.25 is perceived by some as generous.33 One
researcher has calculated that the minimum wage today should be
$18.4234 if it were to match the growth in productivity since 1968,
when the minimum wage had its highest purchasing power.35 The
latest minimum wage bill introduced in Congress would raise the
minimum wage, in stages, to fifteen dollars per hour.36 Because of
current partisan gridlock in Congress,37 no new minimum wage
has been enacted.38

29. See Poverty Threshold, supra note 16.
30. Even at $11.00 per hour, the weekly amount would be $440; $1,760 for four
weeks; and $22,880 for fifty-two weeks, still below the poverty line for a family of
four and substantially within the $31,536 cut off for food stamp eligibility. See id.
31. See SNAP, supra note 26; Memorandum from Lizbeth Silbermann,
Director, Program Development Division, United States Department of Agriculture
to All Regional Directors, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (Aug. 1,
2014),
www.fns.usda.gov/sites/default/files/SNAP_%20FY_2015_Cost_of_Living_
Adjustments.pdf.
32. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1)(C) (2012). Not all employees are covered by the wage
and hour provisions of the FLSA.
33. See Stone, supra note 19 (calling Costco’s high median salary “generous”
and emphasizing the difference between Costco and Wal-Mart in terms of employee
compensation).
34. See David Cooper, Given the Economy’s Growth, the Federal Minimum
Wage Could Be Significantly Higher, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Apr. 14, 2015),
http://www.epi.org/publication/given-the-economys-growth-the-federal-minimumwage-could-be-significantly-higher/ (defining “rate as growth in productivity” as
“the rate at which the average worker can produce income for her employer from
each hour of work”).
35. According to the Congressional Research Service, the purchasing power of
the minimum wage of $1.60 was the highest in 1968. To match 1968’s purchasing
power, the minimum wage should be $10.69 in 2013 dollars. See Craig K. Elwell, A
Fact Sheet: Inflation and the Real Minimum Wage, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. 1 (Jan.
8, 2014), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42973.pdf.
36. See Pay Workers a Living Wage Act, H.R. 3164, 114th Cong. § 2(a)(1) (2015)
(detailing a progressive realization of a higher minimum wage over several years).
37. Phil Andrews, Goodwill Isn’t Enough to Fix Congressional Gridlock, WASH.
POST (Jan. 7, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/goodwill-isnt-goodenough-to-fix-congressional-gridlock/2016/01/07/c70ceb9c-b4a3-11e5-a76a0b5145e8679a_story.html.
38. See Sam Levine, Republicans Refuse to Stand Up and Support Fair Pay,
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Much of the debate about the minimum wage is about jobs.
Some argue that increasing wages would harm workers and the
economy by causing job loss; others argue to the contrary.39 An
increase in the minimum wage, however, affects more than just
jobs. It also affects the amount of taxpayer-funded food stamp
benefits the government must pay to employees of low-wage
employers.40 Many scholars have characterized payments from
the government to employees of low-wage retailers, computed to be
in the billions of dollars, as subsidies from taxpayers to those
retailers.41 These subsidies help retailers keep labor costs low.
Questions arise. Is it unjust for private, low-wage retailers
with monopsony power to benefit from taxpayer money? Is it
unjust to create a business model that enables few top executives
to become wealthy, in part, because low-level employees are paid
so little that the government must provide them with food stamps
and other assistance? The law of unjust enrichment provides
guidance. This Article suggests that the United States federal
government could seek restitution from these low-wage retailers
and recommends that the debate about minimum wage include
analysis of retailers’ unjust enrichment from food stamp benefits.42
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 20, 2015, 10:14 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2015/01/20/state-of-the-union-fair-pay_n_6512400.html.
39. See generally JOHN SCHMITT, WHY DOES THE MINIMUM WAGE HAVE NO
DISCERNIBLE EFFECT ON EMPLOYMENT, CTR. FOR ECON. POLICY RESEARCH (2013),
http://cepr.net/documents/publications/min-wage-2013-02.pdf
(summarizing
economic research on the effect of an increase in the minimum wage on
employment); see also Brishen Rogers, Toward Third-Party Liability for Wage
Theft, 31 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 7–9 (2010), for a detailed discussion of
arguments for and against the minimum wage.
40. RACHEL WEST & MICHAEL REICH, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, THE EFFECTS OF
MINIMUM WAGES ON SNAP ENROLLMENT AND EXPENDITURES 17 (2014),
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/MinimumWagereport.pdf (finding that raising the federal minimum wage to $10.10 would reduce
program expenditures by $4.6 billion).
41. See, e.g., Ken Jacobs, Americans Are Spending $153 Billion a Year to
Subsidize McDonald’s and Wal-Mart’s Low Wage Workers, WASH. POST (Apr. 15,
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/04/15/we-are-spe
nding-153-billion-a-year-to-subsidize-mcdonalds-and-Wal-Marts-low-wage-workers/
(stating that taxpayers are subsidizing individuals who work full-time because
their employers will not pay a living wage); see also WALMART ON TAX DAY: HOW
TAXPAYERS SUBSIDIZE AMERICA’S BIGGEST EMPLOYER AND RICHEST FAMILY,
AMERICANS FOR TAX FAIRNESS 11 (Apr. 2014), http://americansfortaxfairness.org/
files/Walmart-on-Tax-Day-Americans-for-Tax-Fairness-1.pdf; O’Connor, supra note
25.
42. Small businesses must compete against large, low-wage retailers and are at
a competitive disadvantage if the wages they pay their employees deviate far from
the low salaries paid by these retailers. Some small businesses go out of business
because they cannot compete with the large retailers. Not all businesses
considered by some to be small are independently small. For example, some
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In framing the unjust enrichment aspect of the minimum wage
debate, Part I describes the FLSA. Part II describes the law of
unjust enrichment. Part III applies the law of unjust enrichment
to the situation of low-wage retailers. Part IV discusses available
remedies.
I. The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)
The FLSA was passed in 1938, after the Supreme Court
declared its predecessor, the National Industrial Recovery Act
(NIRA) of 1934, unconstitutional.43 While there were differences
between the two acts, both set a minimum wage for hourly
workers and regulated the number of hours an employee could
work.44 The FLSA set a minimum hourly wage, initially $0.25
and, since 2009, $7.25. Importantly, the FLSA provides that those
who work more than forty hours per week are entitled to
additional compensation, above their typical wage.45
The NIRA and the FLSA were passed during President
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal and were designed to pull the
nation out of the Great Depression, in large part by creating jobs.46
From 1929 to 1932, United States’ manufacturing decreased by
almost half47 and national unemployment rose to twenty-five
percent.48 Those who were fortunate to have jobs frequently

franchisees of large low price chains, such as McDonald’s, are nominally owners of
their franchise. The National Labor Relations Board, however, can file complaints
against McDonald’s, USA, LLC and its franchisees as joint employers of the
franchisee’s employees. See NLRB Office of the General Counsel Authorizes
Complaints Against McDonald’s Franchisees and Determines McDonald’s, USA,
LLC is a Joint Employer, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, OFFICE OF PUBLIC
RELATIONS (July 29, 2014), https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/nlrboffice-general-counsel-authorizes-complaints-against-mcdonalds. The analysis of
this article would apply to other chains as well.
43. See Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 542 (1936).
Although the Supreme Court struck down many of the early New Deal programs, it
upheld many of the later programs. The Court upheld the FLSA against
constitutional challenges in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 125 (1941)
(finding that the act was “sufficiently definite” to be constitutional).
44. See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE COMING OF THE NEW DEAL 87–102
(1959), for a detailed description of the provisions and history of the enactment of
the NIRA; see also John S. Forsythe, Legislative History of the Fair Labor
Standards Act, 6 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 464, 464–66, 478–87 (1939) (providing
an overview of the motivating factors behind the passage of the FLSA, including an
overview of critical wage standards).
45. 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a)(1)(C), 207 (2012).
46. See, e.g., TED MORGAN, FDR: A BIOGRAPHY 321–22 (1985) (describing the
economic backdrop of the FLSA); SCHLESINGER, supra note 44, at 102.
47. SCHLESINGER, supra note 44, at 87.
48. MORGAN, supra note 46, at 319.
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worked sixty hours or more per week for very little pay.49
Businesses cut wages to “preserve profits.”50 As historian Arthur
M. Schlesinger, Jr. described:
[T]he firm which worked its labor longest and paid it least
gained the greatest competitive advantage . . . . With the
worker—and the responsible businessman—thus at the mercy
of the greedy, desperate or doctrinaire competitor, standards
of wages and hours, attained after so many years of battle and
negotiation, began to crumble away.51

Today, the United States is recovering from the “Great
Recession” of 2008. While the economy is improving, salaries have
stagnated.52 Some describe the economy now, as Schlesinger did
then, as being “at the mercy of the greedy.”53 Now, as then,
businesses argue that if they raise wages they will not be able to
preserve profits.54 Also, just as they did during the Great
Depression, people debate whether a minimum wage would cause
employers to create or cut jobs.55 Unlike during the Great
Depression, however, employers now know low-wage workers can

49. See NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, HOURS OF WORK IN AMERICAN
INDUSTRY 1 (1938), http://www.nber.org/chapters/c4124.pdf (“From 1890 to 1937, a
period during which records of hours of work have tended to become more complete
and, on the whole, more reliable, the average length of the work week of factory
employees in the United States declined from 60 to probably 42 hours.”).
50. SCHLESINGER, supra note 44, at 90.
51. Id. The doctrinaire competitor that Schlesinger describes was one who
adhered to the principle of orthodox economics that “to maintain wage rates [rather
than cut them] increased unemployment.” Id.
52. Lawrence Mishel, Elise Gould, & Josh Bivens, Wage Stagnation in Nine
Charts, ECON. POL’Y INST. (January 5, 2015), http://www.epi.org/publication/
charting-wage-stagnation/ (explaining that between 1979 and 2013, the hourly
wages of middle-wage workers were stagnant, rising just six percent in total and
less than 0.2 percent per year).
53. SCHLESINGER, supra note 44, at 90. Senator Bernie Sanders, a 2016
presidential candidate, says that corporate greed must end:
Today, millions of Americans are working longer hours for lower wages
and median family income is almost $5,000 less than it was in 1999.
Meanwhile, the wealthiest people and the largest corporations are doing
phenomenally well. Today, 99 percent of all new income is going to the top
1 percent, while the top one-tenth of 1 percent own almost as much wealth
as the bottom 40 percent. In the last two years, the wealthiest 14 people
in this country increased their wealth by $157 billion. That increase is
more than is owned by the bottom 130 million Americans—combined.
Sen. Bernie Sanders, Corporate Greed Must End, HUFFINGTON POST (June 24,
2015, 9:29 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rep-bernie-sanders/corporategreed-must-end_b_7653442.html.
54. BIANCO, supra note 22, at 197 (“The consensus in retailing today—as
epitomized in Wal-Mart—is that holding hourly wages to a bare minimum is
essential to success, if not survival.”).
55. See Pay Workers a Living Wage Act, H.R. 3164, 114th Cong. § 2(a)(1)
(2015).
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supplement their earnings with government-financed food
stamps.56
Congress enacted the FLSA based on findings that “labor
conditions[,] detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum
standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general
well-being of workers[,]” cause the spread of those detrimental
conditions across the country and interfere with the “fair
marketing of goods.”57 In particular, the minimum wage provision
was intended to ensure that people had “minimum standards of
living necessary for health and general well-being.”58 The FLSA
provision limiting overtime was intended not only to protect
workers’ standard of living, but also to stimulate commerce,
increase earning power, and create jobs.59 If an employee worked
only forty instead of sixty hours per week, an employer could add
an additional employee for the extra twenty hours.60 If an
employer required one employee to work more than forty hours,
that employee would receive his or her wages plus additional
compensation.61
Manufacturing productivity would rise with
increased demand from people with more income to spend.62 Thus,
the economy would improve.63
In passing the FLSA, Congress never intended employers to
cut salaries in order to create jobs.64 Rather, reducing wages was
viewed as harming employment,65 because cutting workers’
salaries also cut their spending.66 Reduced consumer spending—
56. See infra Part III.C.1.
57. 29 U.S.C. § 202(a)(5) (1938). The FLSA was passed pursuant to the
Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, therefore, it applies to working
conditions “that substantially affect interstate commerce.” United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995).
58. 29 U.S.C. § 202(a)–(b) (1938).
59. Id.
60. 29 U.S.C. § 207 (1938).
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., Economic Forecast: Strong Consumer Demand Driven by Job
Gains, MFRS. ALLIANCE FOR PRODUCTIVITY & INNOVATION (Nov. 24, 2015),
https://www.mapi.net/blog/2015/11/economic-forecast-strong-consumer-demanddriven-job-gains (describing the positive correlation between consumer income and
manufacturing production).
63. See, e.g., Martin N. Baily, How Manufacturing Can Lead to Future
Economic Prosperity, BROOKINGS INST. (June 29, 2011), https://www.brookings.edu/
blog/up-front/2011/06/29/how-manufacturing-can-lead-to-future-economicprosperity (discussing the aggregate economic benefit of increased manufacturing).
64. Congress clearly stated its intention “to correct and as rapidly as
practicable to eliminate the conditions above . . . without substantially curtailing
employment.” 29 U.S.C. § 202(b) (1938) (emphasis added).
65. Id.
66. Indeed, the FLSA was passed in the wake of the Great Depression, a time
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because of lower incomes—necessitates cutting production because
of diminished demand.
A reduction in production in turn
necessitates cutting jobs, creating a downward spiral.67 Today,
one could argue that if cutting wages creates jobs, employers could
create twice as many jobs as they have now by paying everyone
half of what they are currently making, perhaps as low as four
dollars per hour.68 Presumably, however, spending for goods and
services would decrease dramatically, requiring lay-offs and
initiating another downward spiral.69 Perhaps in today’s stagnant
economy, with little or no inflation, poverty wages are not only
preventing the creation of an upward spiral, but are also causing
stagnation and contributing to continued poverty.
Low-wage retailers claim they are creating jobs.70 By not
authorizing overtime pay, however, they are effectively cutting
wages to create those jobs. For example, if employees work for
sixty hours or more per week, as many do, they must work for at
least two employers.71 When employers use the FLSA’s overtime
requirement to limit the hours of their workers, they are using the
Act to work against those very workers the Act was intended to
benefit. Workers do not receive the overtime pay for extra hours

in which low earnings had a harmful downward pressure on consumption. As
Professor Seth Harris states, “The FLSA ultimately enacted in 1938 sought to
redress substandard wages as a means to remedy the under-consumption which
President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his allies believed sparked and prolonged the
Depression.” Seth D. Harris, Conceptions of Fairness and the Fair Labor Standards
Act, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 19, 21 (2000).
67. See SCHLESINGER, supra note 44, at 173–74 (quoting Donald Richberg,
general counsel to National Recovery Board and Roosevelt aide).
68. See DOUGLAS HOLTZ-EAKIN & BEN GITIS, COUNTERPRODUCTIVE: THE
EMPLOYMENT AND INCOME EFFECTS OF RAISING AMERICA’S MINIMUM WAGE TO $12
AND TO $15 PER HOUR, MANHATTAN INST. FOR POL’Y RES. 2 (July 2015),
http://www.manhattan-institute.org/sites/default/files/ib_36.pdf
(positing
a
negative correlation between wages and number of jobs). Just as with raising
wages, the Fight for Fifteen campaign could cause firms to cut jobs, and a decrease
in wages could lead to job production. Id.
69. See, e.g., Larry Elliott, Pay Low-income Families More to Boost Economic
Growth, Says IMF, THE GUARDIAN (June 15, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/
business/2015/jun/15/focus-on-low-income-families-to-boost-economic-growth-saysimf-study (asserting that declining relative wages of poor and middle class families
contributed to the global economic collapse). Indeed, there is a positive correlation
between the wages of the poorest twenty percent of citizens and aggregate
economic growth. Id.
70. See RICHARD VEDDER & WENDELL COX, THE WAL-MART REVOLUTION: HOW
BIG-BOX STORES BENEFIT CONSUMERS, WORKERS, AND THE ECONOMY 91 (2006).
71. See Lydia Saad, The “40-Hour” Workweek Is Actually Longer — by Seven
Hours, GALLUP (Aug. 29, 2014), http:// http://www.gallup.com/poll/175286/hourworkweek-actually-longer-seven-hours.aspx (finding that nearly one in five
Americans work sixty hours or more per week).

2016]

Food Stamps, Unjust Enrichment

11

of work, contrary to the intent of the FLSA.72 In addition, if two
employees work sixty hours for two employers, no more jobs are
created than if each worked for one employer and was paid for
overtime.73 The result is lower pay for both employees.
In addition to not authorizing overtime, low-wage retailers
frequently send workers home without pay or do not call them in if
business is slow.74 Although not illegal, this practice further
impoverishes employees.75 If the amount of wages earned during
the week by effectively part-time employees were divided by forty
hours, as contemplated by the FLSA, the retailers would be paying
far below the minimum wage per employee. Employers do this
knowing that employees can make up the difference with food
stamps and other benefits.76 By cutting employees’ hours without
any corresponding raise in wages,77 employers are adopting the
economic model rejected by Congress during the Great Depression.
Employers may keep wages and hours low because they know that
their employees have another source of income from
governmentally supplied food stamps and other benefits.

72. For example, an employee who works 60 hours at $7.25 per hour would
earn not only the 40 hour pay of $290, and not only the additional $145 for the
extra 20 hours at $7.25, but also an extra $72.50 because of the “time and half”
overtime rule. See 29 U.S.C. § 207 (2012). This would total $507 per week. If,
however, an employee was limited to working no more than 30 hours per week and,
needing more than $217.50 per week, worked another 30 hours for another
employer, that worker would earn $435, $72 less than the employee working for
one employer. Id.
73. See 29 U.S.C. § 207 (2012).
74. See Alexander & Haley-Lock, supra note 5, at 6–11. Not only do employees
of low-wage retailers work fewer than 40 hours per week, many work far less and
have little or no consistency in their shifts. Id.; see also Charlotte Alexander, Anna
Haley-Lock, & Nantiya Ruan, Stabilizing Low-Wage Work, 50 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 1, 2–5 (2015) (describing the just-in-time scheduling phenomenon, whereby
low-wage employees’ schedules are highly sensitive to market demand).
75. See Alexander, Haley-Lock & Ruan, supra note 74, at 10 (demonstrating
the harms of variable work schedules on worker mobility).
76. See 29 U.S.C. § 207 (2012).
77. See Thomas R. Michl, Can Rescheduling Explain the New Jersey Minimum
Wage Studies?, 26 E. ECON. J. 265, 275 (2000) (harmonizing two studies on the
effect of increased minimum wage on employment—one finding no job loss, the
other finding no job loss but reduction in hours—by concluding that “if the
theoretical model which begins the paper is correct . . . the average worker [with a
wage increase] will have experienced an increase in leisure time with no change in
weekly income” and may even see an increase in both income and leisure). For
further information on these opposing studies, see H.R. 3164, supra note 36; see
also Paul Krugman, Liberals and Wages, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2015, at A47
(describing study by economists David Card and Alan Kruger demonstrating that
raising minimum wage has a positive effect on workers).
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II. Unjust Enrichment
The remedial purpose of unjust enrichment law is different
from that of tort law or contract law. The purpose of tort law and
contract law is to compensate plaintiffs’ losses either from an
injury or from a breach of contract. Unjust enrichment law,
however, does not focus on a plaintiff’s loss but, rather, on a
defendant’s gain.78
An opinion written by Lord Mansfield in 1760 in England is
often said to have been the genesis of the field of unjust
enrichment.79 Unjust enrichment was not generally recognized in
the United States as a separate field until 1937, when the
American Law Institute (ALI) published the Restatement of the
Law of Restitution.80 In 2011, after approximately ten years of
work by Reporter Andrew Kull with advisors and consultants, the
ALI published another edition.81 It was entitled The Restatement
(Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment.82 The term “unjust
enrichment” was added to the title because, in the years since the
Restatement (First) was published, judicial results became
inconsistent and confusing.83 In particular, there was confusion
about terminology. Lawyers and judges oftentimes referred to
restitution and unjust enrichment synonymously, while at other
times as separate theories.84 Although one can parse subtle
differences between the two terms, for ease of understanding, the
Restatement (Third) refers to them as synonyms.85
Section 1 of the Restatement (Third) articulates the
fundamental premise of the law: “A person who is unjustly
enriched at the expense of another is subject to liability in
restitution.”86 While comments to this section caution against
applying the principle too broadly, the comments also caution that
“cases may arise that fall outside every pattern of unjust
78. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 49, at 176
(AM. LAW INST. 2011) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].
79. Moses v. Macferlan (1760) 2 Bur 1005.
80. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION (AM. LAW INST. 1937).
81. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 49.
82. Id. A Restatement (Second) of Restitution was begun, but not completed;
see also Lance Liebman, Foreword to RESTATEMENT (THIRD), at xiii–xiv (describing
the failure to complete Restatement (Second)).
83. See Candace S. Kovacic[-Fleischer], Applying Restitution to Remedy
Discriminatory Denial of Partnership, 34 SYRACUSE. L. REV. 743, 761–64 (1983)
(noting the under-utilization of restitution by courts and advocating for a clearer
lexicon and judicial standard for resolving restitution disputes).
84. Id.
85. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 1 cmt. c.
86. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 1.
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enrichment except the rule of [Section 1].”87 Scholars disagree as
to the scope of the law of unjust enrichment. For purposes of
predictability, some view it as having narrow applicability; others
see it as evolving depending on the circumstances.88 In looking at
the issue of taxpayer subsidy gains to low-wage retailers, this
Article focuses on unjust enrichment’s broader scope.
III. Unjust Enrichment Applied
The three elements contained in Section 1 of the Restatement
(Third) are: (1) enrichment of one party; (2) at expense of another
party; and (3) unjustness of the enrichment.
A. Enrichment
1. Saved Expenditures
The concept of benefit is broad. While a benefit can be a
monetary gain, it can also be a “saved expenditure.”89 Food stamp
payments to employees of low-wage retail stores enrich those
stores by saving them the cost of having to pay higher wages.
Executives of low-wage retailers know that their employees
receive food stamps and other benefits. For example, one of WalMart’s executives said in a confidential memorandum acquired by
the New York Times that, “Wal-Mart has a significant percentage
of Associates and their children on public assistance.”90 It would
be difficult for low-wage retailers to argue that their executives
ignore this knowledge when setting wage scales. The executives
allow their “associates” to receive food stamps in order to have a
business plan that relies on paying low-level employees poverty
wages.

87. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 1 cmt. a, at 4.
88. See, e.g., Peter Linzer & Donna L. Huffman, Unjust Impoverishment: Using
Restitution Reasoning in Today’s Mortgage Crisis, 68 WASH & LEE L. REV. 949
(2011) (discussing the debate between originalists and those in support of an
evolving Restatement (Third)).
89. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 1 cmt. d, at 7.
90. Steven Greenhouse & Michael Barbaro, Wal-Mart Memo Suggests Ways to
Cut Employee Benefit Costs, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/
2005/10/26/business/walmart-memo-suggests-ways-to-cut-employee-benefitcosts.html (quoting Reviewing and Revising Wal-Mart’s Benefits Strategies, a
confidential memorandum from Susan Chambers to the board of directors in 2005);
see also ; O’Connor, supra note 25 (stating that Wal-Mart claimed in 2013 that “the
company has captured 18 percent of the SNAP market”).
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2. Direct Monetary Gain
Low-wage retailers that sell groceries get a direct monetary
benefit when their employees use food stamps where they work, as
many most likely do.91 As a result, employees become conduits for
money to pass from the government to those retailers.
B. At Government’s Expense
Food stamp payments that benefit low-wage retailers are
funded by taxpayers and paid by the government to low-wage
retailers’ employees.92 Although the government has a statutory
duty to provide food stamps to those who qualify, it has no duty,
nor has it agreed, to subsidize low-wage retailers.93 Low-wage
retailers, therefore, are shifting the cost of paying workers a living
wage to the government. The result is that the government is
effectively subsidizing those retailers.
Some people oppose benefit programs, believing that those
programs discourage people from working.94
Many of the
recipients of the programs are working, however, often at two or
more jobs.95 Misapprehension about who benefits from safety net
programs may cause some to oppose political candidates who
support these programs.

91. See, e.g., Wal-Mart, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Mar. 21, 2014),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/104169/000010416914000019/wmtform10kx13114.htm, at 7 [hereinafter Wal-Mart 10K] (stating that one of Wal-Mart’s “six
strategic merchandise units” is “grocery,” which “consists of a full line of grocery
items, including meat, produce, deli, bakery, dairy, frozen foods, alcoholic and
nonalcoholic beverages, floral[,] and dry grocery, as well as consumables such as
health and beauty aids, baby products, household chemicals, paper goods and pet
supplies”). It is convenient to shop where one works, and employees likely receive
discounts. For example, Wal-Mart employees receive a ten percent discount on
fresh fruit, vegetables, and regularly priced general merchandise at Wal-Mart
stores. See Working at Walmart, WAL-MART, http://corporate.Wal-Mart.com/ourstory/working-at-Wal-Mart (last visited Jan. 10, 2017).
92. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2013–2016, 2027 (1964).
93. See id.
94. See, e.g., Ezra Rosser, Poverty Offsetting, 6 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 179, 195
(2012) (stating that many believe the “myth” that “the poor deserve their poverty”).
95. Victoria Smith & Brian Halpin, Low-wage Work Uncertainty Often Traps
Low-wage Workers, CTR. FOR POVERTY RES., UNIV. OF CAL., DAVIS, http://poverty.
ucdavis.edu/policy-brief/low-wage-work-uncertainty-often-traps-low-wage-workers
(discussing the facts that low wage workers often have multiple jobs).
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C. Benefit Retained Unjustly
1. Wrongdoing: Wage Theft
The Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust
Enrichment provides: “A person is not permitted to profit by his
own wrong.”96 Low-wage retailers often have policies that require
managers to make sure employees do not work more than forty
hours per week.97 This policy either encourages the salaried
managers, who are not covered by the wage and hour laws,98 to do
work uncompleted by the hourly employees, or to have the hourly
employees work “off-the-clock.”99 In the first instance, the salaried
employees are working extra hours as if they were hourly
employees but without hourly compensation.100 In the second
instance, hourly employees may be uncompensated for their extra
hours or must reallocate hours so that their pay cards do not show
any forty plus hour weeks. Overtime pay has effectively been
stolen from the employees.101 This “wage theft”102 is said to be
endemic.103
96. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 3.
97. See BIANCO, supra note 22, at 97; see also Nelson Lichtenstein, Why
Working at Wal-Mart is Different, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1649, 1660–61 (2007)
(describing hour limitations); Fact Sheet—Wages, supra note 23 (stating that the
average worker has full-time status at thirty-four hours per week).
98. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (2012) (providing that “any employee employed in
bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity” is exempt from its
wage and hour provisions; this often includes managers).
99. See, e.g., STEVEN GREENHOUSE, THE BIG SQUEEZE: TOUGH TIMES FOR THE
AMERICAN WORKER 98–103, 142 (2008) (describing “off-the-clock” practices); Orly
Lobel, supra note 10, at 1690 (describing lawsuits over wages in which Wal-Mart
paid to settle or was found liable for wage and hour violations); Lichtenstein, supra
note 97.
100. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (2012) (“[A]ny employee employed in a bona fide
executive, administrative, or professional capacity” is exempt from the wage and
hour provision); see also BIANCO, supra note 22, at 88, 90–91; Lichtenstein, supra
note 97, at 1673.
101. See Lichtenstein, supra note 97, at 1674.
102. See, e.g., Weisbard & Leonard, supra note 7, at 430–32 (describing wage
theft cases as including instances where an employer failed to pay minimum wage
or prevailing wages, failed to provide mandated sick leave, failed to pay any wages,
paid less than promised, forced workers to work “off-the-clock,” and failed to pay or
underpaid overtime).
103. See id. at 430–31 (describing how the Employment Justice Center handles
“prevalent” wage theft and other labor violations for low-wage workers); see also
BIANCO, supra note 22, at 90 (describing “massive violations of wage-and-hour
rules in 128 stores”); CHARLES FISHMAN, THE WALMART EFFECT 188 (2006) (same);
Nantiya Ruan, Same Law, Different Day: A Survey of the Last Thirty Years of Wage
Litigation and Its Impact on Low-Wage Workers, 30 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 355,
363 (2013) (describing “multitudes” of “off-the-clock” lawsuits); Daniel V. Dorris,
Fair Labor Standards Act Preemption of State Wage-and-Hour Law Claims, 76 U.
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The Restatement (Third) addresses theft. First, it provides
that “[a] person who obtains a benefit by misappropriating
financial assets . . . is liable in restitution to the victim of the
wrong.”104 The Restatement then provides that financial assets
can be “in any form, whether tangible or intangible.”105 Because
many of the employees forced to work “off-the-clock” must
supplement their income with food stamps, employers who
misappropriate
their
employees’
time
therefore
also
misappropriate taxpayer-funded food stamps.106
In 2002, Wal-Mart’s hourly employees brought a class
action in Pennsylvania state court for wage theft, alleging WalMart had violated Pennsylvania’s Minimum Wage Act.107 In 2006,
the jury awarded the employees $187,648,589.108 In 2014, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the judgment.109 Wal-Mart
filed a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United
States, arguing that the Court should hold that the class
certification violated due process.110 The Supreme Court denied
the petition in April of 2016.111
Because wage and hour suits require a substantial
investment to gather necessary evidence and proceed to trial,112 if
a class bringing suit were decertified, it would be infeasible for
class members to bring suit individually.113 An unjust enrichment

CHI. L. REV. 1251, 1251 (2009) (noting that although twelve suits were still pending
in 2009, Wal-Mart settled sixty-three class action wage-hour suits).
104. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 41.
105. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 40 cmt. a.
106. Besides violating the FLSA to keep wages low, low-wage retailers
sometimes interfere with unionizing, violating the National Labor Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 151, 157, 158 (2012). See Ezra Rosser, Offsetting and the Consumption of
Social Responsibility, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 27, 87 n.208 (2011); Catherine L. Fisk &
Michael M. Oswalt, Preemption and Civic Democracy in the Battle over Wal-Mart,
92 MINN. L. REV. 1502, 1503–04, 1507 (2008).
107. Braun v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 24 A.3d 875 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011).
108. Id. at 889. The class alleged four counts: (1) Pennsylvania’s Minimum
Wage Act, 43 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 333.101–.115 (2009); (2)
Pennsylvania’s Wage Payment and Collection Act, 43 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 260.1–.12 (2009); (3) breach of contract; and, (4) unjust enrichment.
109. Braun v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 106 A.3d 656 (Pa. 2014).
110. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Braun, 106 A.3d
656 (Pa. 2014), Nos. 14-1123, 14-1124.
111. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Braun, 106 A.3d 656 (Pa. 2014), cert. denied, 136 S.
Ct. 1512 (Apr. 4, 2016).
112. Cf. Ruan, supra note 103, at 382–83.
113. Cf. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561 (2011) (finding
that class certification in a Title VII gender discrimination case was improper
because the case used “trial by formula,” in which liability for the whole class was
established based on liability after trial of a sample group from the original class).
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action brought by the government against low-wage retailers,
however, would not need class certification. The government
would be suing on its own behalf, not on behalf of a class.114
2. Misrepresentation
Section 13(1) of the Restatement (Third) provides that “[a]
transfer induced by fraud or material misrepresentation is subject
to . . . restitution.
The transferee is liable in restitution as
necessary to avoid unjust enrichment.”115
Low-wage employers represent that their retail prices are
exceedingly low.116
The retailers seek to attract customers
because of their low prices.117 Their ads tout low prices.118 Their
public filings typically promote their low prices as their particular
business philosophy. For example, in its 10-K for 2014, Wal-Mart
said:
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. . . . helps people around the world save
money and live better—anytime and anywhere—in retail
stores, online, and through their mobile devices. We earn the
trust of our customers every day by providing a broad
assortment of quality merchandise and services at everyday
low prices (“EDLP”) . . . . EDLP is our pricing philosophy
under which we price items at a low price every day so our
customers trust that our prices will not change under frequent
promotional activity.119

While low-wage retailer’s customers, some of whom are their
employees or others who may be poor, benefit from low prices, the
benefit comes at the expense of the government and taxpayers.
Although Wal-Mart’s 10-K claims that its low prices “help[] people
around the world save money and live better—anytime and
anywhere,”120 its employees are not living better, but rather must
endure the stigma of having to apply for food stamps.121
Because many employees receive public assistance as a result
of their low earnings, and because public benefits are funded with
taxes, customers of low-wage retailers who pay taxes pay more for

114. Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
115. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 13(1), at 165.
116. Wal-Mart 10-K, supra note 91, at 5.
117. See id. at 7 (“We earn the trust of our customers . . . by
providing . . . quality merchandise and services at everyday low prices.”).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See BIANCO, supra note 22, at 288–89 (stating that Wal-Mart has the ability
to increase living standards by increasing its wages).
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goods than sticker prices indicate.122 Unlike other governmental
benefits given to companies, such as incentives to relocate, food
stamp payments are not identified as company benefits, but only
as welfare for the poor. As a result, low-wage retailers are
misrepresenting the prices of their goods.123
The low-wage retailers know that their prices do not reflect
what the customers who pay taxes are actually paying.124 This
misrepresentation is material because many customers shop at the
large chains, relying on representations that the products are
among the least costly. In addition, if customers understood the
extent of indirect governmental subsidies to large low-wage
retailers, customers might choose to shop elsewhere to express
their dissatisfaction.125
IV. Remedies
As mentioned in Part III, the remedial focus of unjust
enrichment is measured by what the defendant gained. The
Restatement (Third) provides that “[a] claimant entitled to
restitution may obtain a judgment for money in the amount of the
defendant’s unjust enrichment.”126
A. Comparison with the Tobacco Case
The litigation against tobacco manufacturers suggests a
possible approach to remedy unjust enrichment of low-wage
retailers.127 In 1994, the Mississippi Attorney General brought an
unjust enrichment suit against tobacco companies.128 The theory
was that tobacco companies had been unjustly enriched by not
compensating the state for the Medicaid funds it spent to care for

122. See, e.g., Rosser, supra note 94, at 184–85 (noting that “poverty-related
externalities” such as low wages are not included in the prices of goods).
123. See WILLIAM LLOYD PROSSER & W. PAGE KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §
106, at 737 (5th ed. 1984) (“[D]eceit . . . may be based upon an active concealment
of the truth. Any words or acts which convey a false impression covering up the
truth . . . .”).
124. See supra Part IV.A.1.
125. Cf. Rosser, supra note 94, at 179 (“Awareness of the true social costs of
consumption hopefully will lead to consumer-demanded improvements [and]
provide a . . . mechanism for socially minded consumers to correct for the harms of
their consumption.”).
126. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 49(1).
127. Cf. Doug Rendleman, Common Law Restitution in the Mississippi Tobacco
Settlement: Did the Smoke Get in Their Eyes?, 33 GA. L. REV. 847, 848, 852–53
(1999).
128. Id. at 848.
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the medical needs of people harmed by tobacco products.129
Mississippi sought “damages in an amount which is sufficient to
provide restitution and re-pay the State for the sums the State has
expended on account of the defendants’ wrongful conduct, with
said amount to be determined at trial.”130 While the tobacco
litigation did not result in a court ruling, and although it involved
people who were ill and dying as opposed to living in poverty, it
did result in a substantial settlement131 suggesting the possibility
of the United States government seeking relief from companies
whose impoverishment of employees costs the public money.132
B. Value of Gain from Subsidies
Low-wage retailers who benefit from their employees’ food
stamps are costing the government public money—the amount
spent on that benefit. In an unjust enrichment action, the amount
of a plaintiff’s loss is not necessarily, but can be, the amount of the
defendant’s gain. Section 52(1)(e) of the Restatement (Third)
describes a situation in which a plaintiff’s gain can be the same as

129. An excerpt of the complaint in the tobacco suit, with deep discounters
substituted for tobacco companies is illustrative. The words in capital letters are
for a food stamp case; those in brackets, from the complaint:
Many of the State’s citizens who are ON FOOD STAMPS [afflicted with
tobacco-related diseases] are poor, undereducated, and unable to EARN
MORE THAN POVERTY WAGES [provide for their own medical care].
These citizens rely upon the State to provide FOOD STAMPS [their
medical care,] which reliance results in an extreme burden on the
taxpayers and the financial resources of this State. Yet, these LOWWAGE RETAILERS ADVERTISE LOW PRICES FOR THEIR GOODS
[very citizens, along with our youth, are targeted by tobacco promotional
techniques.]
Mississippi taxpayers have thus unofficially expended
hundreds of millions of dollars in caring for their fellow citizens who LIVE
BELOW THE POVERTY LINE [have and are suffering from lung cancer;
cardiovascular disease; emphysema; chronic obstructive pulmonary
disease; and a variety of other cancers and diseases that were and are
caused by cigarettes.] . . . . While the State and its various agencies and
institutions are struggling to pay for FOOD STAMPS AND OTHER
BENEFITS [the health care costs of tobacco], the LOW-WAGE
RETAILERS THAT ADVERTISE LOW PRICES [tobacco cartel] continue[]
to reap billions of dollars in profits from THEIR LOW-PRICED GOODS
[the sale of cigarettes].
Id. at 853–54 (quoting Compl. ¶¶ 79–80, Moore ex rel. Mississippi v. American
Tobacco Co. (Miss. Ch. filed May 23, 1994) (No. 94-1429)). This author does not
suggest that the actions of deep discounters amount to the fraudulent
misrepresentations made by the tobacco companies or their callous disregard for
people’s health.
130. Complaint ¶ 83(a), Moore, ex rel. Mississippi v. American Tobacco Co.,
(Miss. Ch. filed May 23, 1994) (No. 94-1429).
131. See Rendleman, supra note 127, at 848.
132. Professor Rendleman has criticized the application of restitution to the
tobacco litigation. Id. at 930.
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a defendant’s loss. That section provides that a defendant whose
conduct is in “bad faith or [is] reprehensible” may be liable in
restitution.133 If so, the remedy can be “the value of unrequested
benefits.”134 Although food stamp benefits to employees were not
requested by low-wage retailers, the retailers take specific action
knowing their workers will receive food stamps. The low-wage
retailers’ knowingly profiting from the impoverishment of their
employees is reprehensible. Therefore, the remedy in restitution
can be equal to the amount the government spends to provide food
stamps for the employees of low-wage retailers.135
In addition, wage theft is in bad faith. If an employer
underpays its employees in violation of the FLSA, the employer
must repay the lost wages and may have to pay double the
amount.136
If, however, the employer can show that the
underpayment “was in good faith and that [the employer
reasonably believed] that his [or her] act . . . was not a violation of
the Fair Labor Standards Act,” then the employer may be exempt
from paying double the lost wages.137 In the case of wage theft, an
employer is necessarily acting in bad faith or in violation of the
Act. Again, the remedy in restitution can be equal to the amount
the government spends to provide food stamps for the employees of
low-wage retailers.
C. Value of Direct Monetary Gain
Low-wage retailers receive a payment directly from their
employees who use their food stamps to shop where they work.138
Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT) cards, which food stamp
recipients use, may enable computation of the amount of that
payment.139 EBT cards likely carry the identity of the recipients,

133. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 52(1)(e), at 234.
134. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 52(2)(a).
135. There may also be a number of methods to gather data regarding which
employees receive food stamp payments and how much they receive. One method
would be to cross-reference the identities of employees of the discounters with the
identities of food stamp recipients in the area of the discounters. The identity of
the employees would be in the discounters’ possession; the food stamp recipients, in
the government’s. Then one would total the amount received by each employee of a
particular chain. Since food stamp payments are granted to households instead of
individuals, computing the amount for each employee would involve devising a
method for allocating the amount of food stamp payments to each member of the
household.
136. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012).
137. 29 U.S.C. § 260 (2012).
138. See supra Part III.A.2.
139. Cf. Wal-Mart 10-K supra note 91, at 22 (discussing the transmission and
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the amount of their purchases, and the stores from which the
purchases were made, information which could be cross-referenced
with the names of employees.140 At minimum, the government
should be able to recover from the retailers the value of food
stamps the retailer received from its employees.
Conclusion
Although the public views low-wage retail chains as private
companies, not funded by the government, such retailers receive
not-so-indirect governmental funding. Many employees of lowwage retailers are eligible for food stamps, and the employees’
ability to receive food stamps enables the retailers to keep wages
low. The retailers’ profitability is therefore in part a result of the
government subsidies the retailers receive through food stamp
payments to their employees, a program designed to help the poor.
It is unjust for the low-wage retailers to profit from such
payments.
The law of unjust enrichment provides that one who unjustly
gains at another’s expense must disgorge the gain. This Article
demonstrates that these elements are met in the case of low-wage
retailers paying low wages, which should entitle the government
to recover their unjust gain. The public argument about the
propriety of raising the minimum wage should include not just the
effect of the minimum wage on employment, but also focus on
whether the government is in effect supplementing the minimum
wage.

storage of “cardholder data”).
140. Id.

